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n 2004, ten new members joined the European Union, radically reshaping its geography 
and governance characteristics. Earlier expectations predicted a more gradual process of 
accession – like a more gradual earlier evolution had been expected for the new 
European currency that had been adopted in 1999 by no less than 11 members. But these 
were the times of euro-enthusiasm.  
Euro-optimism implies that rapid convergence of the new member states would happen 
both in terms of economic levels of development and, closely related, governance 
characteristics. Of the former, many studies established a varied picture: strong growth and 
catching up until the crisis, and highly varied continuation during the crisis. In this short 
essay, we look at one important aspect of the story, based on our practical experience with 
EU Structural Funds, particularly the EU Social Fund – since those funds are supposed to 
contribute to convergence, and thus to the EU’s internal cohesion. Our work at trying to link 
the EU funds with such a vitally important issue as the Roma exclusion in the region has 
revealed a complex web of obstacles to a functional use of the funds. The starting point is 
that EU funds are proportionately much more important for the new EU member states than 
for most of the old ones simply because their per capita GDP is much smaller. Thus, their 
share of EU funds is larger both in GDP and as a percentage of the national budget, as well 
as of public investment. Hence it is particularly important that the funds are used 
strategically. 
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Structural Funds and national co-financing as % of total public investment (average 2009-2011) 
 
Source: European Commission (2012): EU Structural Funding for Growth and Jobs. 
Evidence reveals, however, that such an approach is sorely lacking. Truly national debates 
about the structure, proportions and mechanics of the use of EU funds are not taking place, 
thanks to the overall deficiencies of the democratic process. If there is no strong national 
leadership about the best way to use the funds, inevitably the stronger lobby interests will 
prevail at the expense of the weak. Thus the principle of cohesion and solidarity are upset in 
the national context. This problem goes hand-in-hand with strong corruption of the use of 
funds. The European Commission comforts itself in having very strong ‘control’ 
mechanisms in place. Well, these control mechanisms are limited to a narrow 
administrative-accounting oversight. Businesses and officials in most of the former socialist 
countries are far too innovative to be constrained by even enforced accounting rules. The EU 
oversight processes implant very little real strategic thinking in the allocation of funds and 
distribution mechanisms.  
One could imagine two broad approaches and their combinations: one that looks at the 
bottlenecks to economic growth and tries to eliminate them; the other that tries to increase 
social cohesion through improving the life chances of people and communities with little 
access to pubic goods. Neither of these approaches is seriously discussed nor their 
combinations. Allocation mechanisms are prisoners of private interests – since much is at 
stake. So far thus the big promise of structural funds has not materialised as they are not 
spent strategically. 
Improperly designed EU funds have a particular crowding out effect as well. Not only do 
easy public funds crowd out private funds, but they also perpetuate a behaviour that those 
of us old enough to have had experience under socialism know: dependence on, and waiting 
for, the state to provide resources. The market reform is unfinished. We need to be mindful 
that public funds are yes, badly needed, but they do crowd out entrepreneurship and if 
improperly used, their net effect may easily turn out to be negative. 
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ESF 2007-13 interim payments, as % of the envelope in the country, by 30/11/2013 
 
Data source: European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/esf/BlobServlet?docId=249&langId=en). 
Added to the above problems is the fact that many of the NMSs (new member states) lack 
administrative capacities to use the much-needed – and wasted – funds fully. If one looks at 
the table above, it reveals the paradox that the countries that need it most for their 
development are using it the least. And among the NMSs, the poorer and worse a country is 
governed the less it uses the funds proportionately – Romania being at the low end of the 
table. The less well-governed countries are also the ones that are the poorest, so the share of 
EU funds in their national budgets is relatively the largest. 
From this the following conclusion needs to be drawn: the structural and cohesion funds 
were designed for situations of (relatively) good governance. With the accession of poorer 
and worse-governed Central and East European countries, the challenge has emerged to get 
the EU more involved in the way the funds are used. But not only is more involvement 
needed but also a better understanding of international development at the level of the 
European Union. These shortcomings surface in another way as well: while being by far the 
largest development donor, the EU is famously passive about the way it spends this money 
(often taking the position of an ‘administrative redistributor’ rather than a donor). The 
reason is similar: lack of proper understanding of what kind of aid investment is generating 
more economic growth and more social inclusion, less inequality. The current EU fund 
mechanisms thus are very suboptimal. In some cases, probably Poland being among the 
better ones, EU funds seem to be used at least to some extent to help to bridge the 
developmental gap.  The EU sees itself as a redistributor of funds and in no way as ‘donor’ 
But the developmental challenge in most of the new member states is, unfortunately, too 
formidable to permit such a luxury. 
Thus ideas for radical reform of EU funding are needed. One option is to move forward 
towards linking funding with policies (see ‘ex-ante conditionalities’ in the new legislation) 
and results (‘performance framework’). EU funding could perhaps be best utilised if one 
part is used for decreasing government debt, and another part for introducing a limited 
number of significant policy reforms, e.g. linked to EU2020 targets. Partnership contracts 
between the EU and the member states could describe these policy reforms, and the mix of 
tools including legislation, institution-building, national and EU funding. First steps 
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towards such a reform could be taken already with unspent funds (‘de-commitment’) in the 
2014-20 budget period.  
The overall balance of the first 10 years then is positive but not as overwhelming as it should 
be. If countries have difficulty with democracy, surely they would have more if the EU’s 
peer and institutional pressures were not in place. But even more normative pressure is 
needed. Likewise, the NMSs need more vigorous economic systems to close the 
developmental gap – and more clever use of public funds. In the meantime, the EU is also 
caught up in an existential crisis. Luckily, some of the reforms that the EU as a whole needs 
are also ones that the individual new members need: sharper market incentives on the one 
hand and more institutionalised solidarity on the other. Only if the EU – and its member 
states – are unburdened from some of the inertial spending and overregulation can they, on 
one hand, show more vigorous economic growth but also reallocate funds that increases 
cohesion such as more complete energy networks and that also increase social cohesion by 
targeting the needy better. Thus, the fate of the EU at large and its new members’ successes 
are intimately linked. This is going to be the story of the second decade.  
